We investigate the performance and characteristics of acquiring firms on 1148 M&A on the two Chinese stock markets from 1998 to 2003. Using the market model, the CAPM model and the buy-and-hold methods, we find significantly positive abnormal returns before (6 months) and upon M&A announcements, while the long-run abnormal returns (6 months) after M&A are insignificant. Within our sample, cash is the dominant payment method and the competition during M&A is low. The cross-sectional analysis on acquirers' market performance upon announcements shows that the political advantages of acquiring firms have a significantly positive impact on the acquirers' performance, while the economic advantages do not. Cross-provincial M&A and better corporate governance create value to acquiring firms. Finally, cash payment impacts positively and regulation development impacts negatively the performance of acquiring firms during M&A.
Introduction
Examining the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is a popular area for research in finance. To date, however, little research has been done on the M&A in China, despite the rapid development of the Chinese stock markets. M&A in China are different from those in mature markets and have their own characteristics. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study on the M&A in China.
Although M&A started in China in 1993, they did not become popular until the late 1990s due to the late development of the capital market and corporate law. Also, the share segmentation system 1 in China makes tender offers extremely hard. For the Chinese stock markets, in only a few M&A cases, both acquiring firms and target firms are publicly listed companies. Among the majority of the listed-companyrelated M&A transactions, there are two major kinds. The first kind happens when a listed company acquires shares or assets of another company, the vast majority of which are unlisted companies. The second type takes place when a listed company changes shareholders, and in most cases, the buyers and sellers of the assets or stocks 1 Since the vast majority of Chinese listed companies are converted from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the Chinese government does not want to give up controls of these big SOEs completely, there are several categories of shares in Chinese listed companies, hence share segmentation system.
The main categories of shares are the state-owned shares, the legal person shares, A-shares and Bshares. The state-owned shares and the legal person shares are non-tradable. They cannot be traded on the stock exchanges, but can only be exchanged between the government and corporations upon negotiation. Therefore, these shares are very hard to value. The A-shares and B-shares are tradable shares that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and they can be traded by all investors.
of the listed target firms are both unlisted companies. Between 1998 and 2003, two third of the total M&A transactions belong to the first group and one third belong to the second.
The two types of M&A are very different in many aspects. For the first group, the listed companies are acquirers, which acquire either shares or assets of another company. For the second group, the listed companies are the target companies.
However, in most cases, the buyers and sellers are government related unlisted companies and the acquisition of the shares or assets of the listed company is through the over-the-counter (OTC) market, rather than through the stock exchange. The reason for this is that there are different types of ownership within a listed company in China, and the prices for obtaining different types of shares can be very different. It is always much more expensive to buy listed shares through the stock market than negotiating with the government or a holding company to obtain non-tradable shares through the OTC market. To keep the cost low, buyers would naturally try to acquire non-tradable shares or assets of listed companies at lower prices, rather than the tradable shares at much higher prices.
As the second type of M&A is not strictly M&A transactions in the stock market, in this paper, we focus only on the transactions of the first group, studying the market performance and characteristics of the listed acquirers. As the government plays an important role in the Chinese stock markets and most of the Chinese listed companies were state-owned enterprises, interesting questions to ask are whether M&A in China create value for listed acquirers in general; what the characteristics of these M&A are;
and whether the government is trying to assist the stated-owned listed companies by engaging in M&A.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature; Section 3 introduces the data and methodology in this study; Section 4 presents and explains the acquiring firms' performance, Section 5 reports the results on the cross sectional analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Merger and acquisition activity has generated a voluminous of research over the past 30 years. The pre-and post-acquisition behaviours of both acquirers and target firms are examined, and efforts have been made to isolate and measure the impact of the M&A from other events that affect the firm. In general, evidences show that shareholders of target firms earn abnormal returns regardless of the motivations of M&A and types of deals (Franks, et al., 1991; and Schwert, 1996) , while the results on acquiring firms are more ambiguous. Some researchers report negative returns to acquirers (Servaes, 1991; and Franks, et al., 1991) , and others find zero or positive returns to acquirers (Lang et al., 1989; and Schwert, 1996) .
The two basic theories related to M&A are non-value or value maximizing behaviours (Halpern, 1983) . Under non-value maximizing behaviour, acquisitions are aimed to maximize growth in sales or assets or to control a company. Shareholders of target firms would gain, while those of bidding firms would lose. With the value maximization motivation there should be a positive expected economic gain from the acquisitions. Therefore, shareholders of target firms would gain, while those of bidding firms would at least earn a normal rate of return.
Common hypotheses on motives of M&A include synergy, agency motive and hubris, as summarized by Kiymaz and Baker (2008) . Synergy hypothesis documents that mergers create value to the shareholders of the combined firms. Examples of studies that support this hypothesis are Maquieira et al. (1998) and Andrade et al. (2001) . The agency motive suggests that M&A occur to increase the welfare of the management in the acquiring firms at the cost of acquirers' shareholders, while the hubris hypothesis posits that managers over-estimate the value of target companies and high payment of the premiums can damage acquiring firms' shareholder interests. Mueller and Sirower (2003) . In this study, we group these two alternatives.
We first provide some statistical summaries to give an understanding of the characteristics of the M&A transactions and the acquiring firms in China. Table 1 shows the number of M&A in each year during the sample period. It can be seen that Almost none of the acquiring companies acquire tradable shares via the stock exchange. This is consistent with the practical situation in the Chinese stock market.
Out of the three major categories of share ownership in a Chinese company, legal person shares are easiest and cheapest to obtain. To acquire state-owned shares, the process and the paper work involved are complicated, while to buy tradable shares in the stock exchanges requires higher prices to be paid. Therefore, the legal person shares become the natural choice when acquiring shares from the target firms. In terms of the acquiring size, over 50% of M&A transactions acquire more than half of the shares in the target firms. Lastly, for the 412 assets-acquiring M&A, 58.01%
acquire fixed assets and 23.06% acquire current assets.
The question may be asked as to why companies would acquire assets rather than equity. In China, before the economic reform started in 1978, the shareholding corporation did not exist and all Chinese companies were solely state-owned. In the last 30 years, the government has introduced different forms of corporations and has also transformed some SOEs to shareholding companies. However, there are still many Chinese companies that do not have shares. To acquire parts of this kind of company, obtaining assets is the only option. Table 3 .5 indicates that, from the available data, just in over half of the M&A the acquiring firm and target firm belong to the same industry before the transaction. The result shows that the business focus of the M&A transactions in China is not very strong. Table 4 shows the characteristics of acquiring firms in our study. We only focus on acquiring firms since the majority of target firms are unlisted firms, and the information on target firms are very hard to obtain. First, we investigate the ownership of the acquiring firms. of acquiring firms has the top shareholder owning more than 50% of the firm, while in 34.32% of acquiring firms, the sum of the second to tenth shareholding is below 10%. After exploring the characteristics of M&A and acquirers, we then investigate both the short-run and long-run market performance of acquiring firms around the M&A announcements. In this study, we use the Shanghai All A-Share Index and Shenzhen
All A-Share Index as the proxies for the market portfolio as with most Chinese research (Liu and Li, 2000; Chi and Padgett, 2005) .
When studying the stock performance in the short event window (from day -2 to day 2), we employee the standard market model. When studying the long-run stock performance, we use three methods to ensure the consistency of our results, including the market model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 5 and the buy-and-holdabnormal return approach. Since the M&A transactions take place often for Chinese listed companies, we have to balance between multiple transactions and the total number of sample size. We keep one M&A transaction for one company within any 12 months period. Therefore, our long-run study period is 13 months (from -6 months to +6 month related to the transaction). We use this 13-month period to investigate how acquiring firms perform around the M&A announcements and whether there is any information leakage or inside trading in the Chinese stock market.
The descriptions of our study methods on the long-run performance are as follows.
First, when employing the market model, we use the regression model as follows to estimate the alpha and beta of the sample firm:
R is the monthly return for firm i in month t, and mt R is the monthly return for the market index in month t. it ẽ is the error term. Alpha i and beta i are the regression coefficients for firm i. The estimation period is defined from 42 months to 7 months (totally 36 months) prior to the event.
Using the market model, the abnormal return of security i for period t is:
Where i α and i βˆ are estimated market model coefficients.
As an alternative to the market model, some researchers use the CAPM model in either the Sharpe-Lintner or the zero-Beta versions. Here we use the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM and the abnormal returns over the sample periods under consideration are defined as follows:
βˆ is estimated market model coefficient and R ft is the monthly risk free rate in China.
The average risk-adjusted return on a sample of n stocks for each event window is the equally weighted arithmetic average of the risk-adjusted returns:
The cumulative abnormal return, CAR i, for firm i over any event period is:
AR CAR
Thirdly, the buy-and-hold market adjusted return is defined as:
We calculate the buy-and-hold market adjusted return for our sample between six months before to six months after the announcement month and for several shorter time intervals.
The mean market-adjusted buy-and-hold return is defined as:
We assume that the returns follow the normal distribution, and we use the t-test to test the significance of the abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and buy-andhold abnormal returns. A significantly positive/negative abnormal return would suggest that there is profit/loss beyond the compensation justified by the underlying risk.
Discussion of the acquiring firms' performance
We investigate both the short-run (from day -2 to day 2) and long-run (from month -6 to month 6) market performance (abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns) of acquiring firms around M&A. For daily abnormal returns, from Table 5 .1 we can see that the average returns in day -1 and day 0 are both significantly positive at the 1% level. The average daily abnormal returns after the announcements are negative and only significant on day 2. The average cumulative abnormal returns for four short-term event windows (-2/2, -1/1, -2/0 and -1/0) are all positively significant at the 10% or 1% levels. The result shows a strong positive market effect of the M&A announcements on the acquiring firms. In order to ensure the positive abnormal returns around M&A announcements are not caused by other positive announcements such as earnings or dividends announcements, we rerun the test on the sample (576 observations out of the total 931) with M&A announcements outside the annual report disclosure period. The results, reported in Table 5 .2, are the same if not stronger than the results on the whole sample, which 13 confirms that the positive abnormal returns of acquiring firms around the M&A announcements are not driven by other effects.
For monthly abnormal returns, Table 6 reports the results using all three methods (the market model, the CAPM model and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns). When using the market model, we find in Table 6 .1 that the average abnormal return in Month 0 is significantly positive at the 5% level, and the average cumulative abnormal returns from month -6 to 6 and from month -3 to 3 are both insignificant. The average cumulative abnormal return before the announcement (month -6/-1) is much better than after the announcement (month 1/6). Using the Sharpe version CAPM model, the results are much stronger. From Table 6 .2, we can see that the average monthly abnormal returns in Month -5, Month -3, Month -2, Month -1, Month 0 and Month 4 are all positively significant at the 5% or 1% levels. During the 13-month event window, only the average monthly abnormal return in Month 1 is negatively significant at the 10% level. The average cumulative abnormal returns for event windows (month -6/6, -3/3 and -6/-1) are all significantly positive at the 1% level. The same is seen in Table 6 .1 where the average cumulative abnormal return before the announcement (month -6/-1) is much better than the one after the announcement (month 1/6), and the average CAR after the announcement (month 1/6) is insignificantly different from zero. The results using the buy-and-hold method in Table 6 .3 is the same as the results using the CAPM model and CAR calculation in Table 6 .2. In summary, in the long-run, the acquiring firms perform either better or at least the same as the market portfolio and the performance is much better in the six months before the announcement than in the six months after the announcement. The results indicate a leakage of information and the sign of insider trading.
The results on short-run and long-run performance show significant positive market reaction to acquiring companies before and upon M&A, and non-negative market performance after the transaction. Next we examine the characteristics of acquiring firms' performance and value change.
There is a considerable literature explaining the drivers of the value change of M&A.
The variables found to be related to the acquiring firms' returns include managerial share ownership, company holdings of cash, firm leverage, Tobin's Q, management overconfidence, industry relatedness between acquiring and target firms, competition during acquisitions, payment methods and relative size of the target to the bidder.
However, due to the special characteristics of the Chinese stock markets and the M&A transactions, as well as the difficulties of obtaining data on target firms 6 , in this study we only focus on some available variables which would possibly influence the value change for acquiring firms around M&A in the cross-sectional regression analysis.
First, the share segmentation system is a special feature in the Chinese stock markets.
In general, a listed company has three main categories of shares: the state-owned shares, the legal person shares and tradable A-and/or B-shares. According to Jensen (1986) , free cash flow theory predicts that many acquirers will tend to have very good performance before M&A. We believe that if investors are confident about the management of listed acquirers, the financial position of acquirers before M&A should be positively related to the acquirers' market performance at announcements. However, if our assumptions for our ownership hypothesis holds, and M&A in China is viewed by investors as a method to improve the performance of the listed companies, then there will be a negative relationship between the financial performance of acquirers before M&A and acquirers' announcement returns. We use the average three-year profitability of acquirers before M&A as a proxy for the financial performance, since profitability is the major criteria for delisting, and we expect a significantly negative coefficient on this variable.
Besides the special features of the Chinese stock markets which could possibly impact the acquirers' market performance upon announcements, we also examine some standard hypotheses and variables found to be significant in the M&A studies.
The first common finding is that the M&A transaction payment matters. Huang and Walkling (1989) , among others, find that cash payment leads to zero or slightly positive returns at M&A announcement, while stock-related deals lead to significant negative returns. This is consistent with the theory that managers time the issuance of stocks and announce the issuance of seasoned stocks when they believe their shares are over-valued. The interesting characteristic of M&A in China is that the majority of the transactions (87.28%) are solely paid by cash and the stock-for-stock transaction only occurs once in our whole sample. The probable reason for this phenomenon is that within any shareholding company, there are different kinds of stocks -the stated owned shares, the legal person shares, employee shares, and possibly tradable shares.
The valuation of tradable and non-tradable shares is not the same. While tradable shares have trading prices in the market, non-tradable shares do not. Therefore, it is much easier to value a transaction using cash rather than shares, especially nontradable shares. In addition, due to the strict regulation of the CSRC, issuing stocks is an extremely complicated process. However, if the conventional theory holds, in comparison with other payment methods in our sample, cash payment will be positively related to the returns of acquiring firms. Nevertheless, with majority of the sample using cash, we question whether or not we are able to see the difference in the cross-sectional regression results.
Second, the M&A regulation can be costly to investors. Studies in the US (Weir, 1983; Asquith et al., 1983) , document that antitrust actions benefit acquiring and target firms' competitive rivals and increased regulation is related to the wealth decreasing of M&A. As we discussed earlier, the M&A in the Chinese stock markets only started Third, due to the strong influence of the government and the government related shareholders, it is interesting to see whether the level of corporate governance has any effect on the M&A value change. The variable we use here is called "dilution of
shareholding", which is the shareholding of the second to tenth shareholders divided by the shareholding of the first shareholder. If the dilution is strong, which means that the company is not purely controlled by the first shareholder, the power balance among big shareholders will increase the rationalization of the M&A decisions and hopefully the value of acquiring firms. In summary, we have the following hypotheses in our cross-sectional analysis.
H 1 : There is a positive relationship between the state ownership of acquirers before M&A and the acquiring firms' returns upon announcements.
H 2 : There is a negative relationship between the legal person ownership of acquirers before M&A and the acquiring firms' returns upon announcements.
H 3 : There is a negative relationship between the same government dummy and the acquiring firms' returns upon announcements.
H 4 : There is a negative relationship between the acquirers' profitability before M&A and the acquiring firms' returns upon announcements.
H 5 : There is a positive relationship between the cash payment dummy and the acquiring firms' returns upon announcements. We use the market model cumulative abnormal returns over two days before M&A to the announcement day (CAR i ) as the dependent variable in the regression analysis.
The independent variables include the percentage of the state ownership of acquirers before the merger (state-shares), the percentage of the legal person ownership of acquirers before the merger (legal-shares), the same government dummy, the average three-year profitability of acquirers before M&A (profit-before), cash payment dummy, dilution of shareholding, the year dummies and the same industry dummy.
Since the two independent variables (state-shares and legal-shares) are highly correlated, we separate them into two regression equations. Table 7 gives a description of the variables used in the study. The characteristic values of the variables are reported in Tables 3 and 4 .
Estimation results
The results of the regressions on the acquiring firms' performance and value change, which has been corrected for heteroskedasticity whenever necessary, are presented in Table 8 . We have estimated the correlations between independent variables and these estimates do not reveal any correlations that are sufficiently high to warrant concern.
Since the data on the same industry dummy is very limited, we first run the regressions by leaving this variable out.
In Table 8 , the results show that most of our hypotheses can be rejected. First, the different ownership does impact the acquirers' performance differently. Unlike the findings in the study of Chinese SIPs, we find that the state ownership has significantly positive influence on the acquirers' performance, while the legal person ownership has significantly negative impact. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The acquirers that have more state ownership may have more connections through the government, and therefore are able to organize themselves better deals during M&A. While other companies with less government influence (with more legal person ownership) might not be able to perform in the same way during M&A due to the poor management skill and lack of experience that are common among Chinese listed companies. Second, we find that in both regressions, M&A cross provinces performs better than the ones taking place within one province, even though the coefficients are significant just over the 10% level.
Interestingly, the acquirers' profitability before the merger is negatively related to the acquiring firms' returns upon announcements at the 1% significance level in both Finally, we find that in both regressions, the positive significance of year dummies is reducing from the beginning of the study period to the end, showing that as the regulation has been developed over time, the acquiring firms' returns decrease. This result is consistent with the previous literature that the regulation is costly for investors.
We then rerun both regressions by adding the same industry dummy. We did not find any significant results on this new variable, but other results remain the same (the results are not reported in the paper). This further indicates that during M&A in China, investors pay more attention to the political advantages of acquirers (such as government ownership and connections) than the economic advantages (like premerger profitability and industry relatedness).
Finally we compare the profitability of acquiring firms before and after M&A to see whether M&A is actually a useful tool to improve the financial performance for acquirers. The results are reported in Table 9 . For the total sample, the mean and median profitability for the three-year average before M&A are 3.942% and 4.53%
and for the M&A year are 3.394% and 3.86%. Since the t-test of the mean difference is strongly affected by the outliners, here we only use the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test of the median difference, and we find that the median profitability does decrease significantly at the 1% level. This result shows that from the fundamental viewpoint, M&A does not necessarily lead to added value to Chinese listed acquirers, although it might be the intention to achieve this at the first place 7 . Besides the test on the total sample, we also explore the profitability change for a special sample that has the negative three-year average profitability before M&A, since according to the CSRC's regulation, if a listed company has negative profitability for three years continuously, then the shares of this company will be suspended for trading and the company could be delisted. Interestingly we find that, for this sub-sample, the median profitability does increase significantly at the 1% level after M&A. This is very different from the result for the total sample. From Table 9 , we can conclude that M&A cannot necessarily improve the financial performance of listed acquirers in China, at least not in a short-run, but M&A does appear to help retain the listing status of the acquiring firms.
Conclusions
7 We did not use the longer time period financial data after M&A to study the fundamental change of listed acquirers, as the multiple M&A transactions for one acquirer are very common.
To our knowledge, this study is the first comprehensive study on M&A in the Chinese stock markets. Due to the specialties on the Chinese M&A transactions, we focus on 1148 M&A from 1998-2003 where a listed company acquires stocks or assets from another target firm which most often is not listed. We find the number of M&A has increased over time and the majority of shares acquired during M&A are the legal person shares. As for the transactions, majority of them use cash as the only payment method and have no competition during the M&A. It is very common for acquiring and target firms to belong to the same provincial government supervision and to have related party transactions during the M&A. However, with available data, in only half of the sample, acquiring and target firms belong to the same industry before the M&A.
In terms of the characteristics of acquiring firms, we find that concentrated ownership and strong control by the top shareholder before the transaction is predominant.
When we study the market performance of acquiring firms, using the market model, the CAPM model and the buy-and-hold method, we find significantly positive abnormal returns before (6 months) and at the M&A announcements, while the longrun abnormal returns (6 months) after the announcements are insignificant. The crosssectional analysis shows that 1) the political advantages of acquiring firms (the higher state ownership and stronger government connections) have a significantly positive impact on the acquiring firm's performance, while the economic advantages (acquirers' pre-merger profitability or industry relatedness between acquirers and target firms) do not; 2) cross-province M&A implies more choices on the resource of the merger and possibly stronger government connections (the central government rather than the local government), and therefore creates more value to acquiring firms;
3) the power balance between the second to tenth shareholders and the top shareholder has a significantly positive impact to acquirers' returns, due to the possible better corporate governance; and 4) cash payment impacts positively and regulation development impacts negatively on the value of acquiring firms during M&A, respectively.
Lastly, we find that the profitability of acquiring firms decrease significantly from the three-year average before the M&A to the transaction year, while the results are interestingly opposite for a special sample with the negative profitability before the merger. Even though the positive announcement returns show that it is the investors'
belief that mergers in China can improve the listed acquirers' performance, it does not in fact work well on the fundamental side, at least in the short-term. This might also explain the decreasing abnormal returns of acquirers year by year during the sample period. However, M&A seems certainly be able to save the extremely poorly performed acquirers to help keeping their listing status.
However, we leave some questions unanswered in this paper. Since most of the M&A transactions are paid by cash, this puts pressure on acquirers' liquidity and borrowing capacity. It may be interesting to examine the financial reports of these firms around the M&A years to see how they finance these M&A and whether different financing methods generate different results. CAR (-6/6) means cumulative abnormal returns from Month -6 to Month 6. CAR (-3/3) means cumulative abnormal returns from Month -3 to Month 3. CAR (-6/-1) means cumulative abnormal returns from Month -6 to Month -1. CAR (1/6) means cumulative abnormal returns from Month 1 to Month 6. BHAR (-6/6) means buy-and-hold abnormal returns from Month -6 to Month 6. BHAR (-3/3) means buy-and-hold abnormal returns from Month -3 to Month 3. BHAR (-6/-1) means buy-and-hold abnormal returns from Month -6 to Month -1. BHAR (1/6) means buy-and-hold abnormal returns from Month 1 to Month 6.
* Estimate significant at the 10% level. ** Estimate significant at the 5% level. *** Estimate significant at the 1% level. We use the market model cumulative abnormal returns over two days before M&A to the announcement day (CAR i ) as the dependent variable. The independent variables include the percentage of the state ownership of acquirers before the merger (stateshares), the percentage of the legal person ownership of acquirers before the merger (legal-shares), the same government dummy, the average three-year profitability of acquirers before M&A (profit-before), cash payment dummy, dilution of shareholding, the year dummies and the same industry dummy. Since the two independent variables (state-shares and legal-shares) are highly correlated, we separate them into two regression equations. The data on the same industry dummy is very limited, so we first run the regressions by leaving this variable out. We then rerun both regressions by adding the same industry dummy. We did not find any significant result on this new variable, but the results on the other independent variables remain the same (these results are not reported in the paper). 
